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Alerting functionsIntroduction: Medication-related alerting functions may include usability ﬂaws that limit their optimal
use. A ﬁrst step on the way to preventing usability ﬂaws is to understand the characteristics of these
usability ﬂaws. This systematic qualitative review aims to analyze the type of usability ﬂaws found in
medication-related alerting functions.
Method: Papers were searched via PubMed, Scopus and Ergonomics Abstracts databases, along with ref-
erences lists. Paper selection, data extraction and data analysis was performed by two to three Human
Factors experts. Meaningful semantic units representing instances of usability ﬂaws were the main data
extracted. They were analyzed through qualitative methods: categorization following general usability
heuristics and through an inductive process for the ﬂaws speciﬁc to medication-related alerting func-
tions.
Main results: From the 6380 papers initially identiﬁed, 26 met all eligibility criteria. The analysis of the
papers identiﬁed a total of 168 instances of usability ﬂaws that could be classiﬁed into 13 categories
of usability ﬂaws representing either violations of general usability principles (i.e. they could be found
in any system, e.g. guidance and workload issues) or infractions speciﬁc to medication-related alerting
functions. The latter refer to issues of low signal-to-noise ratio, incomplete content of alerts, trans-
parency, presentation mode and timing, missing alert features, tasks and control distribution.
Main conclusion: The list of 168 instances of usability ﬂaws of medication-related alerting functions pro-
vides a source of knowledge for checking the usability of medication-related alerting functions during
their design and evaluation process and ultimately constructs evidence-based usability design principles
for these functions.
 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Computerized Clinical Decision Support (CDS) functions may
have a noteworthy impact on medication management safety [1].
Several studies have shown that they help to improve antibiotic
use [2], drug dosing [3,4], clinical practice [5,6] and patient out-
comes [7]. However, implemented systems may face acceptanceproblems [8,9] that partly originate from poor usability. Poor
usability may lead users to reject CDS functions or to adopt work-
arounds even if the CDS functions are of beneﬁt.
Usability is ‘‘the extent to which a product can be used by spec-
iﬁed users to achieve speciﬁed goals effectively, efﬁciently and sat-
isfactorily within a speciﬁc context of use’’ [10]. Usability goes
beyond the features of the Graphical User Interface (GUI; e.g. legi-
bility of texts), and deals with the functionalities of the product
and with the ﬁt between the system behavior and the needs of
the users’ [11].
Therefore, along with the study of the GUI characteristics,
usability includes the analysis of the way in which the system
responds to users’ actions, of the organization and accuracy of
the knowledge incorporated, and of the availability of functions
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existence of usability ﬂaws. Flaws are violations of usability design
principles, and are additionally known as usability heuristics or
usability criteria [12–15]. They may have an impact on users’ expe-
rience with the system (usage problems) and generate negative
outcomes in the work system (e.g. performance/patient safety
issues) [16]. The present review focuses on usability ﬂaws.
Improving the usability of CDS functions is a necessity [17]. In
the broad sense, according to [18], computerized CDS interventions
refer to a wide range of tools: forms and templates (e.g. to support
proper drug order documentation), relevant data presentation (e.g.
to support optimal decision making), proactive drug order sugges-
tions and order sets (e.g. to ensure that a clinical situation is com-
pletely addressed), protocol supports/clinical pathways (e.g. to
avoid omissions in the care process), reference information/guid-
ance (e.g. to address known information needs) and alerts (e.g. to
prevent errors due to lack of knowledge) [18,19]. These categories
of tools are not exclusive, for instance, alerts may be integrated in
order sets or in protocol supports. Within the whole range of avail-
able computerized medication CDS systems, alerting functions are
known to face serious usability issues [17,20].
One way to prevent such usability issues is to provide manufac-
turers and Human Factors experts with evidence-based usability
design principles [16]. Currently, existing lists of usability design
principles regarding medication alerting functions are not based
on evidence but rather on expert consensus (e.g. [17]) or targeted
review (e.g. [19,20]). This study is part of a project that aims at con-
tributing to the emerging knowledge on usability design principles
to complete the existing lists and identify the usability design prin-
ciples that are supported by evidence in the literature. A ﬁrst step
in that direction is to systematically comprehend the usability
characteristics of medication-related alerting functions.
The present systematic review focuses on medication-related
alerting functions and addresses the following question: ‘‘What
are the usability ﬂaws of medication-related alerting functions
identiﬁed in published studies?’’
2. Method
This systematic qualitative review complies as far as possible
with international methodological guidelines [21,22] as well as
with reporting recommendations [23].
2.1. Eligibility criteria
This review considered only original studies reporting usability
ﬂaws and published after 1980 in peer-reviewed journals or con-
ference proceedings. Only English and French speaking papers
were included. Three eligibility criteria were deﬁned:
 Only medication-related alerting functions supporting the pre-
scribing of medications and used in general hospital or in pri-
mary care general practice were included. Surgery, dentistry,Table 1
Key terms used in the queries according the database searched.
PubMed
Alerting functions terms Medical order entry systems, Medication alert system,
Computerized physician order entry system, CPOE,
Decision Support Systems, Clinical, Clinical decision
support systems, CDSS
Human Factors terms User–computer interface, Human engineering, Risk
factors, Humans, Usabilityanesthesiology, emergency were excluded because the organi-
zation of the medication management of those wards is differ-
ent from the general hospital with respect to the types of
clinicians involved and the nature of the work process.
Pathology or diagnosis management alerting functions were
excluded when they did not include features to support medica-
tion decision-making. Alerting functions dedicated to the
patients as primary end-users were also excluded.
 Usability studies as well as socio-technical studies and impact
studies addressing (at least partially) usability issues were
included. Only papers judged to have high quality reporting of
the study were kept (see Section 2.5 for details). Studies on
more than one system were included if the results presented
insights for each system separately.
 The review targeted studies that reported usability ﬂaws in a
descriptive and objective way. This excluded all studies report-
ing perceived usability assessment or feelings/opinions e.g. col-
lected through usability questionnaires.
2.2. Information sources and search
Information was searched for in on-line references databases.
Themes of searched papers are at the intersection of two domains:
‘‘health technologies’’ and ‘‘ergonomics’’. Therefore three databases
dealing with those themes were chosen; PubMed, Scopus and
Ergonomics Abstract. This search was completed by searching ref-
erences in the reviewed papers.
Two sets of key terms were deﬁned: on ‘‘alerting functions’’ and
on ‘‘usability’’ (cf. Table 1). In each set, terms were combined with
the ‘‘OR’’ operator. Both sets were then combined with the ‘‘AND’’
operator (cf. Appendix 1 for the complete queries). As the
Ergonomics Abstracts database is dedicated to Human Factor
topics, only the ﬁrst set of terms was searched. The language was
restricted to English/French, publication date after 1980, and type
of journals to medical journals. Searches were performed on the
22th April 2012 and updated on the 25th June 2013.
2.3. Study selection process
The study selection was performed by usability experts with
high expertise in Human Factors applied to health informatics
and who had previous experience with medication management
systems, CDS and alerting functions. The selection process is repre-
sented in Fig. 1. At each step of the selection, the review process
was over-inclusive; if in doubt, the item was included for an anal-
ysis at the next step. Agreement scores were calculated between
reviewers on their inclusion/exclusion decisions based on the eligi-
bility criteria (cf. 2.2).
One reviewer (RM) excluded duplicate publications, non-origi-
nal studies and non-peer-reviewed papers. Then, two reviewers
(RM & MCBZ) screened the title of the papers, after a joint training
session on 77 papers that were chosen at random from amongst all
the papers, the reviewers screened 471 randomly selected papersScopus Ergonomics abstracts
Medical order entry, Medication alert,
Computerized physician order entry, CPOE, Clinical
decision support, CDSS
User–computer interface, Human engineering, Risk
factor, Human factor, Usability, Human–computer
interaction
Not applicable
Fig. 1. Study ﬂow.
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471 papers was good (Cohen’s j = 0.67) and discrepancies were
solved through reconciliation meetings. After the review of the
471 papers, considering the amount of papers to review, all
remaining papers were divided between both reviewers to be
screened individually by title. At this step, only papers that were
obviously out of the scope of the review (e.g. genetics or data min-
ing investigations) were excluded.
In the next step, the same two reviewers screened the abstracts
of the selected papers. For papers without abstracts (n = 108), the
full texts were screened directly. A joint training session on 44 ran-
domly selected papers was performed and followed by parallel
individual review on the abstract of 73 papers. The agreement
score was again good (Cohen’s j = 0.69). Considering the amount
of papers to review, the remaining papers were divided between
both reviewers to complete the screening of the abstracts. As for
the previous step, only papers obviously out of the scope of the
study were excluded.
Once the screening of abstracts was completed, the full-texts of
the selected papers were screened by three reviewers (MCBZ, SP
and RM): after a training session on 20 randomly selected papers,
reviewers individually analyzed 20 other papers. The agreement
score was almost perfect (Fleiss’ j = .95) and thus each reviewer
screened a subset of the remaining papers. The excellent agree-
ment score shows that the eligibility criteria, including the deﬁni-
tion of objective usability ﬂaws, were sufﬁciently well-described to
support non ambiguous decision-making. The motive for rejecting
a paper was documented.2.4. Data extraction and analysis
Data was collected for all included papers by two reviewers
through several independent readings (MCBZ & RM). Where avail-
able, on-line appendices of the papers were also analyzed. During
the data collection process any disagreement was solved by discus-
sion. Authors of [24–28] were e-mailed to get more information.
A review reporting form was used for data extraction that
included three sections:
 Description of alerting function:
– Alerting function may either be used standalone, or be inte-
grated into a larger information system such as a CPOE or an
Electronic Medical Record (EMR).
– Medication-related alerting functions may target several
kinds of clinical information. Kuperman et al’s [9] classes
of medication-related decision support were used to catego-
rize the functions: drug allergy checking, basic and advanced
dosing guidance, formulary decision support, duplicate ther-
apy checking, drug-drug interaction checking, advanced
guidance for medication-associated laboratory testing,
advanced checking for drug-disease interactions and con-
traindications, and ﬁnally advanced drug-pregnancy alert-
ing. Those classes are non-exclusive: a single alerting
function may include several classes of clinical information.
– Alerting functions may issue different modes of alerts [19]
and were accordingly categorized as (a) interruptive (active,
pushed alerts), i.e. alerts designed as modal dialog boxes
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pulled alerts), i.e. alerts displayed in a non-intrusive asyn-
chronous presentation format or (c) mixed, i.e. combining
both interruptive and non-interruptive formats of alerts.
– Moreover, we considered the stage of development of the
alerting function either during the design process (‘‘under
development’’) or when it is in use.
 Description of methods: The methods applied in the studies to
collect usability data were extracted. This extraction was sup-
ported by a checklist of methods listed in usability standards
[29] and in a focused review [30]. The checklist included the fol-
lowing items of observation, interviews, user-testing (including
think-aloud), heuristic evaluation, focus groups, retrospective
data analysis (expert review), cognitive walkthrough, question-
naires, telephone and e-survey, log ﬁles analysis, experimental
design and performance measurement, critical incident analy-
sis, creativity methods, contextual inquiry, collaborative evalu-
ation, automated evaluation, brainstorming, document analysis,
document-based methods, model-based methods, parallel
design.
 Objective descriptions of usability ﬂaws: Any violations of a
usability principle described from the system’s perspective.
Usability ﬂaws are descriptions of the characteristics of the sys-
tems that do not adhere to usability principles. They may con-
cern the system’s GUI, its behavior and the suitability of the
knowledge implemented within it for users’ needs and the
availability of features needed to perform a task. Therefore the
objective descriptions may describe all of the above mentioned
dimensions. Items representing instances of usability ﬂaws
were searched for in the results and discussion sections of the
included papers. Only items reported in a descriptive, objective
and reproducible way were retained in the analysis process in
order to get reliable data; hypotheses drawn by the authors of
the included studies were not analyzed.
‘‘Duplicate instances’’ of ﬂaws, i.e. descriptions of usability ﬂaws
detected in a given function and that were reported in several
papers on the same study, as well as instances described several
times in the same paper, were presented together in a single
instance.
Once the data extraction was complete, each extracted usability
ﬂaw was categorized according to the usability design principle it
violated. Design principles can be described in a variety of different
ways (e.g. [12–15]) however it has been identiﬁed that differently
named principles can reﬂect the same inherent usability concepts
[31]. The main differences reside in their construction, in the pre-
cision level of the principles and in the instructions on how they
should be applied. Scapin and Bastien’s usability design principlesTable 2
Main Scapin and Bastien’s usability principles (cf. [14] for sub-criteria’s description).
Usability criteria Deﬁnition
Guidance Refers to the means available to advise, orient, inform, instruct,
alarms, labels, etc.), including from a lexical point of view
Workload Concerns all interface elements that play a role in the reduction
efﬁciency
Explicit control Refers to the system processing of explicit user actions, and to th
Adaptability Refers to system’s capacity to behave contextually and according
Error
management
Refers to the means available to prevent or reduce errors and to
data entry, invalid format for data entry, incorrect command syn
Consistency Refers to the way interface design choices (codes, naming, forma
applied to different contexts
Signiﬁcance of
codes
Qualiﬁes the relationship between a term and/or a sign and its r
semantic relationship between such codes and the items or actio
Compatibility Refers to the match between users’ characteristics (memory, perce
hand, and the organization of the output, input, and dialogue for[14] were chosen for this review as unlike other sets of design prin-
ciples, they were based on a review of recommendations published
in the literature and in standards and then reviewed by experts,
not only from experience. Additionally, Scapin and Bastien’s usabil-
ity design principles [14] were considered by both reviewers as
being most precise with easy to apply instructions.
Scapin and Bastien’s [14] set of heuristics is composed of eight
main usability design principles and 18 sub-principles (cf. Table 2).
The ﬁrst seven principles (guidance, workload, explicit control,
adaptability, error management, consistency and signiﬁcance of
codes) are applicable to any kind of computerized system. The
eighth principle, ‘‘compatibility’’, considers how the characteristics
of the system under design/evaluation ﬁt:
 The characteristics of the tasks to be performed with/supported
by the system.
 The characteristics of the typical end-user(s) (mental model,
knowledge organization, cognitive tasks) and.
 The characteristics of the typical end-user(s) workﬂow.
The compatibility principle accounts for the speciﬁcity of the
task to perform, i.e. in the present context, the interaction of the
clinicians with the alerting function. It is not a principle that has
previously been divided into sub-categories. Therefore, to account
for the different dimensions of the ﬂaws speciﬁc to the medication
alerting functions, sub-categories of ‘‘compatibility’’ ﬂaws were
developed by both reviewers (RM & MCBZ) in an interactive and
inductive manner. During this process any difﬁculties and dis-
agreements were discussed between both reviewers to achieve
clear, unambiguous, and mutually exclusive sub-categories with
a high internal consistency and on which both reviewers were in
complete agreement. At the end of the categorization process, each
usability ﬂaw was assigned to a unique category and sub-category.
2.5. Bias assessment
To ensure the validity of the eligible studies, two eligibility cri-
teria concerning the report and the method of the studies were
deﬁned. Both criteria were selected because they were necessary
if the study was to be reproduced. During the analysis process,
two reviewers (RM & MCBZ) scored each paper individually on
two 5-point Likert scales (from 1 = poor report/method to 5 = very
good report/method) regarding the following criteria:
 Report: completeness and clarity in the description of the aim of
evaluation study, the context of evaluation, the function under
evaluation (including type of system, stage of development),
the setting in which it is (to be) implemented, and in the results.and guide the users throughout their interactions with a computer (messages,
of the users’ perceptual or cognitive load, and in the increase of the dialogue
e control users have on the processing of their actions by the system
to the users’ needs and preferences
recover from them when they occur. Errors are deﬁned in this context as invalid
tax, etc.
ts, procedures, etc.) are maintained in similar contexts, and are different when
eference. Codes and names are signiﬁcant to the users when there is a strong
ns they refer to
ptions, customs, skills, age, expectations, etc.) and task characteristics on the one
a given application, on the other hand
264 R. Marcilly et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 55 (2015) 260–271 Method: completeness and clarity of the applied methods. This
included an assessment of the method(s) applied, a description
of participants (number, proﬁle and experience in the setting
and/or with the system), and examination of the study design
(i.e. single evaluation, comparison between systems and/or
pre- post- re-engineering).
When any of the two scores was equal to one on the 5-point
Likert scale, the paper was excluded. The usability ﬂaws reported
in the included studies may have differing description levels, cre-
ating a risk of bias across studies. By selecting studies reporting
on usability ﬂaws that were sufﬁciently self-explanatory (i.e.
usability ﬂaws’ descriptions that do not need supplementary
information to be understood), the potential for bias was
mitigated.
Moreover, publication and selective reporting biases had an
impact on the review. Firstly, conference proceedings do not pro-
vide as much space for describing usability ﬂaws as do journal
papers with on-line appendices. Secondly, the focus of the study,
e.g. alerting function vs. EMR/CPOE that includes an alerting func-
tion or pure evaluation study vs. entire design cycle study, could
also have an impact on the report of usability ﬂaws. Since the
aim of the review is to achieve a comprehensive description of
all usability ﬂaws reported in previous studies on medication-re-
lated alerting functions, those biases were handled by performing
only qualitative analysis.3. Results
3.1. Study selection
The study design is schematically described in Fig. 1. The data-
base searches and the searches within publication references
identiﬁed 6380 publications. After the removal of duplicate pub-
lications, non-original studies and non- peer-reviewed publica-
tions (n = 1109), screening of the titles and of the abstracts
excluded 4817 publications and rendered 454 papers eligible for
further full-text review. Based on the full-text review, 428 papers
were also excluded. Nine publications were excluded due to qual-
ity concerns in the reporting style: either the usability ﬂaws and
the method applied were not precisely described, or the discus-
sion of the results confused ﬂaws of different systems [32–40].
Finally, a total of 26 papers met our inclusion criteria and were
used for detailed analysis. One [28] out of the two papers claim-
ing to have on-line appendices did not provide them despite e-
mailing the authors. On-line appendices of only one paper were
analyzed [41].3.2. Results of the bias assessment
Only studies judged to have acceptable validity were included
in the analysis: after rating the validity of the included papers, nine
papers were excluded due to quality concerns in the reporting
style. Overall, the report quality was average (mean score = 3.46,
median = 3.5) and the method quality was relatively good (mean
score = 3.88; median = 4) for the included publications.
For the differing levels of description in the reported usability
ﬂaws, only studies reporting self-explanatory usability ﬂaws were
selected. Amongst the 168 instances of usability ﬂaws identiﬁed in
the studies, 155 are verbatim from the papers and only 13 (7.74%)
needed rephrasing to make the usability ﬂaws clearer. Rephrasing
was based on complementary information provided in the papers,
screenshots of the functions along with users’ and designers’
comments.3.3. Characteristics of included papers
The set of 26 included papers comprises ten conference pro-
ceedings and sixteen journal papers. These papers report evalua-
tions of 19 different systems integrating alerting. For two
instances, two papers reported separate evaluations of the same
system ([26,27] and [42,43]). Seven papers report evaluations of
a CPOE that contains both non-interruptive and interruptive alert-
ing functions. It was not identiﬁable whether both functions
worked similarly or not therefore each of the seven papers was
analyzed separately. Amongst these papers, three report different
evaluations of non-interruptive alerts [14,44,45] and four report
a unique study on interruptive alerts [41,46–48]. Since the latter
four papers provide the same results, ‘‘duplicate instances’’ of
usability ﬂaws are presented together.
The main characteristics of analyzed papers are summarized in
Table 3. In the following paragraphs, when the number of studies
does not total 26 (or 19 functions), papers do not report on the pre-
sented issue.
There is no clear mention in any of the papers of the functions’
design/implementation stage therefore deductions, based on the
context of the studies, have been made to obtain this information.
The large majority of the functions (16 in 23 papers) belong to sys-
tem already in use, amongst them one paper reports an evaluation
during a redesign process [49,50] and one an evaluation without
real patient data [51]. Two other systems were still under develop-
ment at the time of evaluation [52] and one was acquired by the
hospital but not yet implemented [28].
Two alerting functions are standalone software [52]. The other
17 functions (in 24 papers) are integrated either into EMR, CPOE
or into electronic patient records.
Classes of medical information targeted by the alerting func-
tions [9] are not reported in a systematic manner. The most
reported class is ‘‘drug-drug interaction checking’’ (for 10 alerting
functions in 15 papers). There are also six alerting functions that
include ‘‘drug-allergy checking’’, ‘‘duplicate therapeutic checking’’
or ‘‘basic dosing guidance’’ (respectively in 9, 11 and 8 papers).
Evaluations of ‘‘advanced guidance for medication-associated lab-
oratory testing’’ are reported in two alerting functions (in 6
papers). Evaluations of ‘‘advanced dosing guidance’’, ‘‘formulary
decision support’’ and ‘‘advanced drug-pregnancy’’ alert are
reported once.
Twelve alerting functions (17 papers) are interruptive, three are
non-interruptive (5 papers) and three are mixed systems (3
papers).
Each paper included a detailed description of the methodology
applied and the data collection methods used. The included papers
proposed a great variety of methods. Eighteen papers combine at
least two methods such as observations [24,41,44–48,50,53–55],
interviews [24,41–48,50,52–56], focus groups [54,57–59], user
testing [26,51,52], simulation [43,49,50], cognitive walkthrough
[27,51], heuristics evaluation [28,60], questionnaire [49,50,52,58],
survey [50,54], retrospective analysis [25,42,61] and log ﬁles anal-
ysis [50]. Eight papers apply one method amongst the above men-
tioned [25,27,28,56,57,59–61].
3.4. Categories of identiﬁed usability ﬂaws
Overall, 168 instances of usability ﬂaws are reported and cate-
gorized. No inter-experts agreement score was calculated because
both experts performed this categorization process, including the
development of the sub-categories, together.
The subsequent sections of this review describe the categories
and sub-categories of usability ﬂaws. The ultimate aim of this
research is to look for evidence for usability design principles ded-
icated to medication alerting functions, therefore a focus is drawn
Table 3
Main characteristics of the selected papers.
System Mode of alerting Integration Classa Design stage Methods
VA Computerized
Patient Record
System
[48] Interruptive In CPOE DA, DT, DDI,
AGML
In use Observations, interviews
[46] Interruptive In CPOE DA, DT, DDI,
AGML
In use Observations, interviews
[41] Interruptive In CPOE DA, DT, DDI,
AGML
In use Observations, interviews
[47] Interruptive In CPOE DA, DT, DDI,
AGML
In use Observations, interviews
[45] Non-interruptive In CPOE No data In use Observations, interviews
[49] Non-interruptive In CPOE No data Redesign of system in
use
User testing, simulation, questionnaire
[44] Non-interruptive In CPOE No data In use Observations, interviews
Medicator  [26] Interruptive In CPOE BDG, DT, DDI In use Heuristics evaluation, user testing, experimental
design
[27] Interruptive In CPOE BDG, DT, DDI In use Cognitive walkthrough
Medicatie/EVS  [42] Interruptive In CPOE BDG, DT, DDI,
AGML
In use Retrospective analysis, interviews
[43] Interruptive In CPOE BDG, DT, DDI,
AGML
In use Simulation
Other [24] Non-interruptive In patient record BDG, DDI,
ADG
In use Observations, interviews
[61] Interruptive In CPOE DA, DT, DDI In use Retrospective analysis
[57] Interruptive In CPOE DA, DDI, ADP In use Focus group, Interviews
[53] Interruptive In CPOE No data In use Observations, interviews
[59] Mixed In EMR No data In use Focus group
[51] Interruptive In CPOE BDG In use but evaluated
with fake patients’ data
Cognitive walkthrough, user testing
[25] No data In CPOE DA, DT In use Retrospective analysis
[60] Interruptive In EMR DDI In use Heuristics evaluation
[50] Non-interruptive Standalone No data Under development Observation, interviews, log ﬁles analysis,
simulation, questionnaire, e-survey, telephone
survey
[56] Mixed In EMR/CPOE DDI In use Interviews
[54] Interruptive In CPOE DA, BDG; FDS In use Observations, interviews, focus groups
[52] Interruptive Standalone DDI Under development Interviews, user testing, questionnaire
[55] Interruptive In CPOE DA, DT, ADP In use Observations, Interviews, e-survey, telephone
survey
[28] Interruptive In CPOE BDG Prior to
implementation
Heuristics evaluation
[58] Mixed In patient record DDI In use Focus groups, questionnaire
a Acronyms for the classes [9]: DA, ‘‘drug allergy’’; DT, ‘‘duplicate therapy’’; DDI,’’ drug-drug interaction’’; BDG, ‘‘basic dosing guidance’’; ADG, ‘‘advanced dosing guidance’’;
ADP, ‘‘advanced drug-pregnancy alert’’; AGML, ‘‘advanced guidance for medication-associated laboratory testing’’; FDS, ‘‘formulary decision support’’.
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poses a synthesis of the categories of reported usability ﬂaws.
For more details, the reader may refer to Appendix 2 that presents
the complete list of instances of usability ﬂaws.
3.4.1. General usability ﬂaws
Guidance infractions refer to issues related to prompting the
user(s): important information is not highlighted, information is
displayed in the visual periphery and instructions are unclear.
There are also instances of the lack of distinction of alerts accord-
ing to format: alerts with different severity levels are not visually
distinguished as well as alerts of different types. There are also leg-
ibility issues along with lack of immediate feedback and heteroge-
neous presentation of alerts presenting the same severity level.
Workload-related usability ﬂaws are mainly related to the
excessive number of actions to be performed either to obtain infor-
mation or to enter data. Other workload infractions refer to dense
information and to non-concise information.
Violations of the signiﬁcance of codes criterion are related to
non-intuitive icons and wording. There are also issues with the
consistency of the behavior of the system; it does not work the
same way across use and according to the data it analyzes.
Instances of explicit control issues are related to the fact that the
system does not act as the user required and due to the lack of usercontrol; there is no way to undo an action. An instance of adapt-
ability ﬂaw is also observed, as the system does not support all
types of users. Finally, an instance of error management ﬂaw is
reported; the message that is supposed to explain a problem
related to the alerting function is not clear.3.4.2. Medication-related alerting functions-speciﬁc usability ﬂaws
Six categories of CDS-speciﬁc usability ﬂaws are identiﬁed.3.4.2.1. Low signal-to-noise ratio. The category of ‘‘low signal-to-
noise ratio of alerts’’ deal with the failure to consider the context
of use including the clinical context (patient clinical case), the set-
ting context (user’s expertise or ward habits, clinicians’ priority,
good practices and pharmacist knowledge), logistical context (care
logic) or the care context (actions already taken by the clinicians).
The category also deals with problems of reliability of the data trig-
gering the alerts, there are several instances are reported of alerts
that appear erroneously due to clinical data not being up-to-date.
Seven issues of alert redundancy are observed. They include prob-
lems of re-appearance of the same alert throughout the same order
entry, problems of system logic that does not consider the relevant
solutions proposed by the users, and ﬁnally problems of the impos-
sibility of de-activating a speciﬁc alert for a speciﬁc patient.
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tion in the alert and to the wrong content, rendering the alert use-
less. The missing information is related to one of three topics: the
purpose of the alert (clinicians are facing alerts containing only the
name of incriminated medications, without the reason why they
are triggered, their severity and supporting scientiﬁc evidence),
contextual information (patient’s condition of importance regard-
ing the alert, information necessary to interpret data within the
alert such as lab results), and suggestions of actions to be taken
to avoid (or to manage) the detected potential problem. Other
instances are related to suggested actions that are ‘‘clinically erro-
neous’’ as stated in the studies analyzed.
3.4.2.3. Function is not transparent enough for the user. Flaws in this
category refer to the fact that the system does not provide sufﬁ-
cient information for the user to know how it works. Instances deal
with a lack of transparency about the way the alerting function is
operating: what knowledge is applied to trigger the alerts (and if it
is up-to-date), how alerts are categorized by severity or what
actions users can perform on the system. Some instances reveal a
lack of information about the data that is used by the system to
trigger alerts. Clinicians are not informed that some data is
screened while other data is not, and that the medications’ map-
ping implemented in the alerting function does not consider all
possible usages of a medication.
3.4.2.4. Alert appearance issues: timing and mode. This category
illustrates alert appearance timing issues: the alert appears after
the decision is made or the alert appears before the decision-mak-
ing process is started or just at the wrong moment. There are also
instances of low processing, slowing down the appearance of the
alert. Finally, there are issues with the mode of presentation of
the alert, i.e. their level of intrusiveness: alerts are either too intru-
sive, distracting the clinician from the decision-making process, or
not sufﬁciently intrusive being unnoticed.
3.4.2.5. Tasks and control distribution issues. This category identiﬁes
that tasks and control distribution ﬂaws are related to alerting
functions’ behavior that is unsuitable for the cooperative and dis-
tributed aspects of the medication use process. The alert is dis-
played to the clinicians who are not concerned by it (e.g.
physiotherapist or psychologist). It is displayed once to a single
clinician, not to the whole team. The alert and users’ comments
on it may also not be transferrable between clinicians who take
care of the patient.
3.4.2.6. Alert features issues. This category deals with the lack of
alert features adapted to support decision-making or the instanti-
ation of a decision. Some instances are related to the volatility of
alerts: the clinician cannot choose to reconsider an alert later in
the decision making process. Moreover, the user cannot access
additional information directly from the alert nor can they act to
solve the problem highlighted by the alert through actions featured
in the alert. The clinician must go back to the patient’s record/
ordering system to ﬁnd information or to take action. Finally, there
is an instance of a feature that does not suit clinicians’ workﬂow
and so the alert is recorded in the patient’s progress note outside
the template compelling clinicians to search for it in the entire
note.
4. Discussion
This review ﬁts into a project aiming at contributing to the
emerging knowledge on usability design principles to complete
the existing lists and identify those that are supported by evidencein the literature. The present systematic review aimed at answer-
ing the question ‘‘what are the usability ﬂaws in medication-re-
lated alerting functions identiﬁed in published studies?’’ to
provide comprehensive knowledge on the usability ﬂaws already
reported for those functions.
Two main kinds of usability ﬂaws have been observed: general
usability ﬂaws and speciﬁc usability ﬂaws. General usability ﬂaws
are related to infractions of good guidance practices, workload, sig-
niﬁcance of codes, explicit control, adaptability, error management
and consistency (Table 4). General usability ﬂaws can be observed
whatever the type of computerized system. They are known for
potentially making the use of the system harder [14]. The results
also highlight types of usability ﬂaws that are speciﬁc to medica-
tion-related alerting functions (Table 4): low signal-to-noise ratio,
content issues, transparency issues, appearance (timing and mode)
issues, tasks and control distribution issues and alert features
issues. Those ﬂaws are not only dealing with the GUI of the func-
tion but concern all components of the alerting functions including
the knowledge implemented in it, its triggering model and the
behavior of the function.
When this system is put in use, those usability ﬂaws may neg-
atively affect the quality of the physicians’ interaction. Therefore, it
is interesting to discuss the potential links between the categories
of ﬂaws that have been observed in medication-related alerting
functions and the steps of the interaction. A structured model of
user’s interaction with a tool is needed to support this discussion.
Norman’s 7-stage model of action [62] presents the interaction
process as two phases: action phase and evaluation phase (cf.
Fig. 2, top). Adapted to the interaction of a physician with a med-
ication-related alerting function, the ﬁrst step of the model, the
goal of the interaction, is to check the appropriateness of the pre-
scriptions. Two action/evaluation loops may be described. The core
one deals with the ‘‘display/reading’’ of the alert. The second one,
‘‘acknowledgment’’, depends on the alerting function model
(sometimes, no acknowledgment is required). For the ‘‘display/
reading’’ loop (loop a, Fig. 2, top left), when forming the intention
to use the alerting function, physicians may be plagued with ‘‘low
signal-to-noise ratio’’, ‘‘alert content’’ and ‘‘alert appearance’’
issues. By affecting frequently other steps of the interaction, those
issues may ultimately create ‘‘alert fatigue’’ and even rejection of
the alerting function [5,63]. At the following step, ‘‘guidance
issues’’ may bother physicians to specify the sequence of actions
to notice and retrieve an alert (e.g. unclear guidance). The execu-
tion of speciﬁed sequence of action may be greatly affected by
‘‘guidance’’, ‘‘signiﬁcance of codes’’, ‘‘workload’’, ‘‘explicit control’’
and ‘‘alert features’’ issues (e.g. confused terminology in labeling
of buttons). Once the alert has been displayed on the screen of
the alerting function, physicians have to read it: ‘‘guidance’’,
‘‘workload’’, ‘‘signiﬁcance of codes’’ and ‘‘alert appearance’’ issues
may hamper this step (e.g. users must use vertical scrolling and
go through several tabs to get complete information). Then, ‘‘signif-
icance of codes’’, ‘‘consistency’’, ‘‘error management’’, ‘‘alert con-
tent’’ and ‘‘transparency’’ issues (e.g. relevant data to interpret
the alert are missing) may impact the interpretation of alert’s con-
tent. Finally, ‘‘low signal-to-noise ratio’’ issues might hinder the
assessment of alert’s relevance according to patient’s prescription
(e.g. the multiplication of irrelevant alerts prevents physicians
from ﬁnding the relevant ones). Once the alert is interpreted,
physicians may have to acknowledge the alert (loop b, Fig. 2, top
right). No type of ﬂaw has been found that hinder the intention
of acknowledging the alert while ‘‘guidance’’ issues may impact
the step of speciﬁcation of the action ‘‘accept/override’’ the alert
(e.g. acknowledgment requirement is not always marked).
However, physicians may be hampered to actually acknowledge
the alert by ‘‘guidance’’, ‘‘workload’’, ‘‘explicit control’’, ‘‘signiﬁ-
cance of codes’’ and ‘‘alert features’’ issues (e.g. several actions
Table 4
General and medication-related alerting functions’ speciﬁc categories of usability ﬂaws and references of the papers from which they were retrieved.
General usability ﬂaws Studies
Guidance issues
Prompting issues: unclear text, information highlight deﬁciency, alert/information far from the center of the screen, no detail [24,43,46,50,52,56,58,61]
No distinction by format (shape, color) of different severity alerts, types of alerts or types of message (system vs. medical alerts) [41,48,57,60]
Legibility issues: not sufﬁcient inter-line space, font in capital letters, size of elements too small [41,48,52]
No feedback to inform the user that (s)he has just missed an alert [43]
Too much distinction by location: no grouping of same severity alerts [60]
Workload issues
Minimal action: too many actions for entering information or obtaining information (e.g. scrolling, tabs) [42,44,46,50,53,59,61]
Information density: too much information of different kinds in the window, several alerts in the same window, alert content displayed
in a one-paragraph format
[24,41,46,48,50,51]
Lack of concision [55–57]
Signiﬁcance of codes issues
Non-intuitive wording [26,42,49,50,59]
Non-intuitive icons [44,50]
Consistency issues
Inconsistency of behavior of the system across use or according to data analyzed [28,46]
Explicit control issues
Explicit user actions: system’s action does not correspond to the action requested by the user [44]
User control: there is no way to undo an action [45]
Adaptability issues
Lack of ﬂexibility: the system does not support all user types [41]
Error management issues
Quality of error message: problem messages are unclear [41]
Usability ﬂaws speciﬁc to medication-related alerting functions
Low signal to-noise-ratio
Alerts are irrelevant regarding: expertise/ward habits, existing validated good practices, pharmaceutical knowledge, data considered,
patient case, actions engaged, clinician’s interest for at risk situations, care logic, no detail
[24,26,41–43,45–48,57–59]
Low signal-to-noise ratio without speciﬁc description [41–44,46,48,53,55,57,59]
Alerts are redundant: alerts appear very frequently/several times during the decision making, clinically relevant solutions from the
clinicians are not accepted, no feature for turning-off a speciﬁc alert in a speciﬁc context
[41,44,45,48,55,56,59]
Alert content issues
Information required to make a decision is missing: the actions that could be taken, patient data, the problem detected its evidence and
its severity and information for interpreting data within the alert
[42,43,47,49,51,53,61]
The alert’s content proposes erroneous suggestions: the proposed action does not suit the clinical context, no detail [26,44]
Function is not transparent enough for the user
The alerting function is not transparent about the way it works: no information about the alert severity scale, about the up-to-dateness
of the alerts’ rules or no detail
[24,41,45,46,51,60]
The alerting function is not transparent about the data it uses: all available data is not used to trigger the alert or incomplete mapping [25,28,41,48,59]
Alert appearance issues: timing and mode
Alert does not appear at the right moment to support the decision making process: before the decision process starts, at the wrong
moment, after the decision is made
[24,27,51,54–56,59]
Data processing is slow [41,44]
The alert’s display mode does not suit the decision making process: not sufﬁciently intrusive, too intrusive [59]
Tasks and control distribution issues
Alert not displayed to the right clinician or only to the pharmacist [43,54,58]
The alerting function allows users to enter comments that are displayed to no one [41,61]
Alert not transferable from one clinician to another [44]
Alert features issues
Alert features are missing: no feature for reconsidering an alert later, no access to additional information from the alert, no action tool to
solve the problem from the alert
[41,43–45,50,60]
Alert features are not adequately designed to suit users’ needs [44]
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acknowledged, ‘‘guidance’’ and ‘‘workload’’ issues may affect read-
ing the alert acknowledgment status (e.g. no feedback after hitting
a button). ‘‘Signiﬁcance of codes’’, ‘‘consistency’’ and ‘‘error man-
agement’’ issues may prevent from interpreting this status (e.g.
non intuitive status icons). Finally, no type of ﬂaw has been
observed that may impact the assessment of the acknowledgment.
In summary, usability ﬂaws may impact both action and evalu-
ation stages. This highlights that the design of the interaction and
the design of the information have to be improved. Both ‘‘display/
reading’’ and ‘‘acknowledgment’’ loops may be affected by those
ﬂaws even if it appears that ﬂaws speciﬁc to medication-relatedalerting functions are more likely to impact the ‘‘display/reading’’
loop (except ‘‘alert features issue’’).
It has to be noticed that not all types of ﬂaws match the inter-
action model (Fig. 2, bottom). Indeed, Norman’s model reports the
individual interaction with the alerting function, not the workﬂow
nor the collaborative characteristics of the work. Yet the workﬂow
may be deeply impacted by ‘‘alert appearance’’ issues (e.g. high
intrusiveness of alerts) and collaborative tasks may be hampered
by ‘‘adaptability’’ and ‘‘tasks and control distribution’’ issues (e.g.
features missing to transfer an alert to a colleague).
This systematic review has limits and biases that must be con-
sidered. In the reviewed papers, the description of the functions
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whether usability ﬂaws are related to a speciﬁc type of the alerting
function. Another limitation is restricting the review process to
peer-reviewed papers, potentially putting aside institutional or
companies’ reports. Relevant usability studies could have been
missed. However, only a peer-reviewed publication process could
guarantee that the methods applied in those studies are of sufﬁ-
cient quality. The quality of the review method reﬂects this, with
only nine of the included papers excluded.
Publication and selective reporting biases could have poten-
tially impacted the representativeness of the results. Moreover,
some types of ﬂaws are easier to picture in a few words or with
a screenshot (e.g. guidance) while others require long descriptions
of a system’s behavior to be understood (e.g. error management).
This may have impacted, at least partially, the representativeness
of the results (e.g. one instance for error management but
twenty-nine for guidance). This representativeness bias may have
impacted the diversity of the usability ﬂaws reported as compared
to those actually existing in alerting functions. However, all cate-
gories of ﬂaws identiﬁed included instances that come from differ-
ent papers: the overlapping of data from various sources ensures
the reliability of these results.
The systematic review process highlighted papers that initially
met the inclusion criteria but further examination revealed that
signiﬁcant data was missing from the methods and/or the results
section of the papers. This problem has been identiﬁed by previous
systematic reviews on usability characteristics of medical software
(e.g. [64] for CPOE). In this review, only papers with sufﬁcient data
in the study method have been analyzed; nine papers were
excluded after initial acceptance due to missing data. This repre-
sents a loss of about a fourth of the total number of papers that
could have been analyzed. Moreover, even in the included papers,Fig. 2. Top: Norman 7-stage model of action adapted to the interaction of a physician wi
Loop a ‘‘display/reading’’ the alert (left) represents the core interaction of the physician w
all alerting functions allow acknowledging alerts. Bottom: characteristics of physician’s insome information non-essential for the topic of the review (e.g. the
class of CDS, the context of use) was often brieﬂy described. There
is an actual need for reporting guidelines for usability-related
papers [65] as has been done for HIT evaluations [66]. Moreover,
this review has also illustrated the advantages of on-line appen-
dices to describe usability ﬂaws [41] exhaustively and in detail
provides much useful data. The use of on-line appendices has to
be encouraged for the reporting of the whole set of usability ﬂaws
uncovered by the study and the precise description of the system.
This proposal is currently under examination in an international
Delphi study [67]. A demand for high quality reports for Human
Factor evaluation will enable a repository of high quality studies
to be created. However, this repository is necessary to capitalize
on usability data in order to ultimately look for evidence for usabil-
ity principles.
The results of this review provide insight on the topic of usabil-
ity ﬂaws in alerting functions by precisely detailing the types of
usability ﬂaws reported for alerting functions. Moreover, in their
current state they are directly useful, a list of 168 actual concrete
instances of usability ﬂaws that characterize those functions is
now available. Even though it may not be representative of the
entire set of usability ﬂaws that could possibly be found in medica-
tion alerting functions, it is exhaustive considering what has been
published on this topic.
As far as we know, it is the ﬁrst time that such a list based on
empirical illustrated knowledge has been proposed for medical
software. This list could be used as an illustrated check-list for
usability mistakes not to be made by Human Factor experts,
designers and health informatics project managers to facilitate
the identiﬁcation and correction of potential usability ﬂaws during
the design, evaluation, procurement and implementation
processes.th an medication-related alerting function and potentially impacting usability ﬂaws.
ith the system. Loop b ‘‘acknowledgment’’ represents a second order interaction: not
teraction not matched by Norman’s model and potentially impacting usability ﬂaws.
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of the usability features of medication-related alerting functions
for the present list represent the current state of knowledge on
usability ﬂaws problematic for those functions. Moreover, those
data should also be completed by searching incident reports for
medication-related alerting functions [68]. This will enable us to
identify new kinds of ﬂaws not yet reported in the literature and
enhance the database developed by the current review.
This study reports the ﬁrst mandatory step to seek evidence for
usability design principles for medication-related alerting func-
tions. The ﬂaws identiﬁedmay have an impact on users’ experience
with the system and negatively affect the work system (e.g. gener-
ating patient safety issues). This impact may have different sever-
ity levels considering its object from low to potentially harmful.
Therefore, further studies must endeavor to identify the conse-
quences of those ﬂaws in terms of usage problems and usability-
related outcomes in the work system. This will help us to weight
the usability ﬂaw categories in order to ﬁnd out which ones are
more dangerous and should be set as a priority and ultimately sup-
port the construction of evidence for related usability design prin-
ciples that take clearly into account the consequences of the
infractions of those principles [16]. The required next step will con-
sist in developing usability design principles to help ﬁx the usabil-
ity ﬂaws. For now, only preliminary tracks of recommendations
can be proposed:
 Improve the design of the interaction: reduce the gap between
the way the system actually works and users’ mental model of
the system, guide users to understand the limits of the alerting
function and how to act upon it properly, consider the various
proﬁles of users in terms of features needed and terminology.
 Improve the design of the information: reduce the effort
required for users to perceive and interpret alerts, reduce the
number of irrelevant alerts, provide relevant and structured
data within each alert, the alerting system must correctly per-
form actions required by the user.
 Design the system as a team player and as a clinician’s partner:
the design of the alerting system must support physicians’
actual workﬂow and the existing cooperation between clini-
cians. The model of work implementing in the alerting system
must take into account the various proﬁles of users and their
interactions.
In order not to reinvent existing principles, categories of usabil-
ity ﬂaws in medication alerting functions will be matched with
existing related usability design principles. The results of this oper-
ation will enable the identiﬁcation of existing lists of usability
design principles that are supported be evidence of the literature.5. Conclusion
The present systematic review aimed at identifying the usabil-
ity ﬂaws that have been reported in previous studies on medica-
tion-related alerting functions. Results identiﬁed 168 instances of
usability ﬂaws that were categorized into eight categories of gen-
eral ﬂaws completed by six categories of ﬂaws speciﬁc to medica-
tion-related alerting functions. The 168 instances represent 168
usability mistakes not to be made. This list can be used as a usabil-
ity check-list during the design, the evaluation, the procurement
and the implementation process of medication-related alerting
functions.
Knowing those ﬂaws is a ﬁrst step to provide recommendations
for improving the usability of medication-related alerting func-
tions. Further studies are needed to identify the known potential
consequences of those ﬂaws in terms of usage problems andoutcomes in the work system and to provide suitable and precise
usability design principles.
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